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Abstract
A strong structural regularity of classes is found in soccer teams ranked
by the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) for the time in-
terval 2009-2014. It concerns 424 to 453 teams according to the 5 competi-
tion seasons. The analysis is based on the rank-size theory considerations,
the size being the UEFA coefficient at the end of a season. Three classes
emerge: (i) the few ”top” teams, (ii) 300 teams, (iii) the rest of the in-
volved teams (about 150) in the tail of the distribution. There are marked
empirical laws describing each class. A 3-parameter Lavalette function is
used to describe the concave curving as the rank increases, and to distin-
guish the the tail from the central behavior.
keywords: team ranking soccer rank-size relation Lavalette function ×
intrinsic complexity
1 Introduction
Nonlinearity and complexity are common features of a large number of sys-
tems studied in modern science [1]-[9]. In many cases, researchers have de-
tected the existence of power laws, for different characteristic quantities of such
complex systems. These interesting contributions, at the interfaces of various
disciplines, are often tied to various technical questions or are limited to the
analysis of distribution functions, themselves considered to be the first to look
at for characteristics of complex systems, but without conveying questions tied
to self-organizations [8] or external constraints [9].
In particular, ranking analysis has received much attention, since Zipf [10]
observed that a large number of size distributions, Nr can be approximated by
a simple scaling (power) law Nr = N1/r, where r is the ranking parameter, with
∗Associate researcher
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Nr ≥ Nr+1, (and obviously r < r + 1). Zipf´s idea has led to a flurry of log-log
diagrams showing a straight line through the displayed data such that ”any”
size distribution, more generally called yr, reads
yr =
a
rα
, (1.1)
i.e., the so called rank-size scaling law. The scaling exponent α is considered
to indicate whether the size distribution yr is close or not to some optimum
(equilibrium) state [10], i.e. when α = 1. The amplitude a can be estimated
from the normalization condition. Indeed, the pure power-law distribution, for
a continuous variable, known as the zeta-distribution [11, 12, 13], or discrete
Pareto distribution, reads
p(k) =
k−γ
ζ(γ)
(1.2)
where p(k) is the probability of observing the value k, a positive integer, γ is the
power-law exponent, and ζ(γ) ≡∑∞k=1 k−γ is the Riemann zeta function; note
that γ, in Eq.(1.2) must be greater than 1 for the Riemann zeta-function to be
finite. Therefore, for the discrete distribution, Eq.(1.1), a ' kM/ζ(α) ∼ kM/2,
where kM is the largest value of k.
This might be the case in sport competition ranking, though the number of
scales is obviously finite. Here below, an analysis of data from a specific nonlin-
ear complex system, i.e. the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)
team ranking, as a specific modern society interesting example, is discussed.
The data is described and its analysis performed in Sect. 2 through simple
empirical laws in order to introduce possible fits. The classical rank-size, hyper-
bolic, Eq.(1.1), relationship is not found for UEFA teams. On the contrary, after
many data statistical tests (not reported), classes emerge, best seen through the
use of a 3-parameter, thus generalized, Lavalette function. A top, a middle and
a low class of teams appear. Several remarks serve as conclusions, in Sect. 3.
Warning: it should be obvious that the ranking of a team may change from
a year to another, after some season; see Appendix. There is no further con-
sideration here on the time evolution of a team through the ranking. No doubt
that the time dependence of the ranks should be of interest as well, but, due to
likely economic conditions, beside sport ones, such a subject is left for dynamic
evolution studies, including evolution modeling, outside the present aims.
Note, in concluding this introduction, that the literature on sport ranking is
very large, in particular tied to economics questions, as in [14, 15, 16, 17]. Thus,
we mention a few publications where soccer and ranking from direct measures
(win, draw, loss) have been considered:
• Stefani 1997 pioneering survey of the major world sports rating systems,
including soccer through FIFA1 rules, is first to be noted [20];
• Kern and Paulusma 2001 paper discussing FIFA rules complexity for com-
petition outcomes, leading to team ranking [21], from where
• Macmillan and Smith, explaining country ranking in 2007 [22]; such a
theme being reconsidered by
1 At the time of writing, FIFA [18], is made of 6 confederations [19], grouping 209 Member
Associations squads, ∼ ”countries”, 53 of them being in the UEFA.
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UEFA coeff. 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14
N. of teams 424 439 443 450 453
Minimum 0.150 0.183 0.183 0.133 0.449
Maximum 136.951 151.157 157.83701 157.605 159.456
Mean (µ) 15.293 15.359 15.693 16.050 16.662
Median 4.838 4.825 5.180 5.809 6.825
RMS 27.95 28.67 29.35 29.75 30.54
Var (σ2) 548.85 587.15 616.47 628.91 656.61
Std Error 1.138 1.156 1.180 1.182 1.2047
Skewness 2.519 2.669 2.716 2.745 2.917
Kurtosis 6.799 7.712 8.072 8.337 9.621
µ/σ 0.653 0.634 0.632 0.640 0.650
Table 1: Summary of statistical characteristics for UEFA team ranking coeffi-
cient data
• Ausloos et al. [23] comparing the FIFA country ranking, based on games
between national squads, to the country UEFA ranking, based on team
game results, and
• Constantinou and Fenton [24] determining the level of ”ability” of (five
English Premier League seasons) soccer teams based on the relative dis-
crepancies in scores between adversaries.
2 UEFA team coefficient data
Usually, the ranking represents the overall performance over the period of 5 con-
secutive seasons [25], after averaging points obtained in various competitions, at
the end of each year (more exactly season), only for teams having participated
in the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League. Thus, e.g.
the 2009/10 coefficient results from games having taken place in 2005/06 . . . ,
2009/10. The rules are more complicated than a ”win-draw-loss” rating. They
depend on the success at some competition level, and differ according to the
competition. A UEFA coefficient table is freely available and is updated regu-
larly depending on the competition timing. Here below, 5 different consecutive
seasons data are examined: 2009/10, . . . , 2013/14 (till May 2014).
The number of concerned teams ranges from 424 to 453 according to the
season. In statistical physics terms, this is an open system, with birth and death
processes. However such events mainly occur for the ”not too top” teams. The
statistical characteristics of the ranking distributions for the various years are
given in Table 1. It can be noticed that the mean is increasing rather slowly, as
do the skewness and kurtosis, indicating a widening of the distributions, and a
kind of moving average effect, but µ/σ ∼ 0.64 is rather stable indicating some
shuffling mainly among the top teams.
2.1 Empirical Ranking Laws
Beside the classical 2-parameter power law, Eq.(1.1),
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• the mere exponential (2 parameter fit (b, β) case
y(r) = b e−βr (2.1)
and the Lavalette 2-parameter free (κ2, γ) form, when the data crushes
at high x-axis value, as it results from a finite size of the number N of
system elements [27],
y(r) = κ2
[ N r
N − r + 1
]−γ
(2.2)
and 3-parameter statistical distributions, like
• the power law with cut-off [28]:
y(r) = c r−λ e−ζr. (2.3)
• and a mere generalization of Eq. (2.2), i.e., allowing for two different
exponents (γ and ξ) at low and high ranks [29, 30]:
yN (r) = κ3
(N r)−γ
(N − r + 1)−ξ (2.4)
should be also considered.
Note that, in Eq. (2.2) and Eq. (2.4), the role of r as the independent
variable, in Eq.(1.1), is taken by the ratio r/(N −r+1) between the descending
and the ascending ranking numbers. Moreover, practically at data fitting time,
one can also use
y(u) ≡ Λˆ u−φ (1− u)+ψ (2.5)
with u = r/(N + 1), emphasizing a sort of universality form. For ψ = 0, it
reduces to Eq.(1.1). Observe that the slope on a log-log plot in the central
region, at u = 1/2, is equal to −2(φ+ ψ).
2.2 Data Analysis
The yearly ranking of the teams as a function of their UEFA coefficient is shown
in Fig. 1, on a semi-log plot; a different color and symbol are used for each year;
the coefficient values have been multiplied as indicated in the inset to make the
data readable. The change in curvature (near r = 200) suggests consideration
of a Lavalette function for describing the data rather than a mere power law or
exponential law, or their product as in Eq.(2.3). These 3 laws would imply a
tail at high rank.
Nevertheless, a sharp change in behavior can be noticed at very low ranks
when a smooth line is drawn through the data at first. Indeed, the derivative
of this guiding line for the eye has a sharp peak at a r1 value given in Table
2. Below this rank value, the best empirical law fitting the data is markedly a
power law, as found on a log-log plot (not shown). The exponent is given in
Table 2 as well.
For completeness, note that the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm [31, 32,
33, 34] has been used for the fitting procedure of the data to the mentioned
non-linear functions.
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09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14
N (≡ d+1) 424 439 443 450 453
Λˆ 45.58 47.34 48.58 47.60 43.29
φ 0.201 0.205 0.206 0.214 0.241
ψ 4.053 4.455 4.557 4.326 4.104
χ2 1878.5 2018.4 2378.0 3041.0 4.531.8
R2 0.992 0.992 0.991 0.989 0.985
α 0.11 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.05
N top 7 7 6 5 3
φ 0.37 0.37 0.30 0.31 0.37
ψ 2.83 3.16 3.68 3.51 2.84
Table 2: Summary of parameter values in Lavalette 3-parameter free reduced
form, Eq. (2.5), for UEFA team ranking data overall N ranges in each season; d
is the number of degrees of freedom (=N −1) in a χ2 test; the data corresponds
to Fig. 4. The α exponent results from a power law fit to the ranked top team
coefficients. The last 2 lines refer to a 3-parameter Lavalette function fit to the
middle class and low class team data
2.3 Rank Classes
Next, consider an example, as in Fig. 2, i.e. the 2011/12 ranking distribution
of the teams due to their UEFA coefficient, on a log-log plot. An overall fit by a
generalized Lavalette function implies a too strong importance of the low rank
coefficients, curving the fit line too strongly at moderate ranks (not shown).
Observing the relatively well pronounced hyperbolic shape at very low rank,
a straight (red) line, i.e., a power law fits can be made for the 6 top teams.
Thereafter removing such ”top class” teams from the fit, a Lavalette function
fit can be attempted, as indicated by the blue dash lines. Note that the fit
deviates again from the data at a shoulder rank r ∼ 170. Nevertheless, the
χ2 and R2 values indicate very significant fits. Similar considerations hold for
the other seasons, but the data is not displayed for conciseness. It is available
from the author upon request. A point should be emphasized here. Observe
the change in the power law exponent between the low ranks and the medium
rank ranges: from 0.17 (except for 2013/14, - which might be due to incomplete
data at the time of downloading) to 0.37. Approximately the same values and
changes occur in the other 3 cases. Note the high value of the ψ exponent, i.e.
∼ 3.0.
In order to indicate the ”universality” of the findings, let the u variable,
introduced here above be considered for the ranking. A log-log plot of the
ranking distributions of the teams due to their UEFA coefficient as the function
of the universal variable u is shown in Fig.3: different colors and symbols are
used for different seasons; the coefficient values have been multiplied as indicated
in the inset to make the data distinguishable. The consistency is remarkable.
The figure allows to emphasize the different regimes, at ∼ 0.015 and ∼ 0.20
in all cases. There are finer structures, but not so obvious ones, likely due to
some reshuffling effects of the team ranks, and the sort of moving average which
occurs when calculating the season rank from the five season coefficients.
The final ”proof” of the classes is found in Fig. 4 through a log-log display
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Figure 1: Yearly ranking of the teams as a function of their UEFA coefficient:
different colors and symbols are used for different seasons; the coefficient values
have been multiplied as indicated in the inset to make the data distinguishable
of the ranking distribution of the teams due to their UEFA coefficient. The
”universality” is convincing. The arrows indicate deviations between fits and
data, defining the low rank (u ∼ 0.012, i.e. r ' 6 ) ”top class” teams, the
”middle class” team regime, and the ”low class” team regime after a shoulder
for u ∼ 0.35, i.e. r ' 160.
3 Concluding remarks
The classical rank-size relationship [35, 36], underlying the description of social
complex systems, has been examined for the ranking of soccer teams in UEFA
competitions. The indicator of such a sport team class system has been consid-
ered to be the team UEFA coefficient. The UEFA coefficients originate from
complicated rules (not discussed here) which seem to imply the creation of team
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Figure 2: Log-log plot of the 2011/12 ranking distribution of the teams due to
their UEFA coefficient: the straight (red) line is a power law fits to the 6 top
teams; it is followed by a 3-parameter Lavalette (blue dash lines) function fit to
the other 436 teams, a fit which deviates from the data at a shoulder rank r ∼
170. Nevertheless, χ2 and R2 values indicate very significant fits
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Figure 3: Log-log plot of the ranking distribution of the teams due to their
UEFA coefficient as the function of the universal variable u: different colors and
symbols are used for different seasons; the coefficient values have been multiplied
as indicated in the inset to make the data distinguishable
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Figure 4: Universal log-log plot of the ranking distribution of the teams due to
their UEFA coefficient; different colors and symbols are used for different seasons
(ynn/mm); the straight power law fits for the top teams are not emphasized; the
3-parameter Lavalette (colored dot or dash lines) functions are shown; arrows
indicate deviations between fits and data, defining the low rank (u ∼ 0.012,
i.e. r ' 6 ) regimes, the middle class regime, and the low class regime after a
shoulder for u ∼ 0.35, i.e. r ' 160
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classes. A sharp conclusion is first reached that the distribution of UEFA team
ranking does not follow a single power law, nor an exponential, in fact. Instead
of this, it appears that the rank-size distribution contains 3 classes, approxi-
mated by a mere scaling (power) law, with a quite different exponent, ' 1/5 or
1/3 - suggesting a sort of order-disorder phase transition, in a thermodynamics-
like sense, between the low and medium rank teams. Moreover, through this
log-log search for an empirical law, attempting a Lavalette function, as in other
informetrics systems, the middle class is enhanced. As a moral conclusion, it
seems that the UEFA rules are close to favorize a sort of Matthew effect, for the
top (7 or so) teams, - which is not without recalling economic considerations
[14, 15, 16, 17].
It is commonly accepted that the rich teams are those which are better
ranked. There is no study here about the correlation between team richness nd
UEFA ranking. It is often considered that there is some correlation, but this not
completely proven [37]. Indeed, the first top 10 teams do not fall permanently
in the top class, as shown in the Appendix. Note that Paris St Germain is a
typical outlier in this respect, not appearing in the top 10. If the content of the
top class changes from one season to another, it is mainly due to the ”organizing
rules” for UEFA ranking, based on 5 years results in specific competitions. Since
the ranking is much due to Champion’s and Europa League games, indeed the
ranking stems from results in such competitions.
In this respect, some physics modeling can be suggested for future work,
along the lines of open systems in a necessarily non-equilibrium state. Recall
that the UEFA ranking allows new teams ”to come in” every year. A few can
move out after 5 years. By considering a non-equilibrium ensemble of many
replicas as a large, and therefore thermodynamic, system, extensive variables
can be defined such that well-known thermodynamic concepts and relations can
be applied to small systems. Rubi and coworkers, following Hill’s line of thought
[38, 39] have shown how to construct such a nonequilibrium thermodynamics for
finite size systems too small to be considered thermodynamically in a traditional
sense [40], thereby suggesting theoretical work on the rank-size relationships.
In future work, it would be of interest to examine whether the UEFA rank
measure could be used to quantify a finer description of the main classes. Non
universality, or class types, might also be measured through the central slope
−2(ψ+ φ). In so doing one might also imagine weighting performances, see e.g.
[41] in the case of NCAA College Football Rankings, whence organizing more
homogeneously based team competitions, or regulating various sport conditions
implying team (but also individual athletic competitions) ranking2. This may
implies considerations about team budgets and expectations, - if more compet-
itiveness is of interest to the organizers.
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2Recall horse racing, where an extra weight is put on a horse depending on previous
competitions, in order to level somewhat the field
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Team 09/10 rank Team 13/14 rank
FC Barcelona 1 down Real Madrid CF 1
Manchester United FC 2 down FC Barcelona 2
Chelsea FC 3 down FC Bayern Munchen 3
Arsenal FC 4 down Chelsea FC 4
Liverpool FC 5 down(*) Manchester United FC 5
FC Bayern Munchen 6 up SL Benfica 6
Sevilla FC 7 down(*) Club Atletico de Madrid 7
FC Internazionale Milano 8 down(*) Valencia CF 8
AC Milan 9 down(*) Arsenal FC 9
Olympique Lyonnais 10 down(*) FC Porto 10
Real Madrid CF 13 up(**) AC Milan 11
FC Porto 15 up(**) Olympique Lyonnais 12
SL Benfica 17 up(**) FC Internazionale Milano 13
Valencia CF 20 up(**) Sevilla FC 25
Club Atletico de Madrid 23 up(**) Liverpool FC 32
Table 3: Illustrating UEFA team rank evolution from 09/10 season to 13/14
season, either going down (*) , moving out of the top 10 rank, or going up (**)
moving into the top 10 rank
APPENDIX
In this Appendix, in order to illustrate a reviewer question about rank evo-
lution, it is shown that the top teams are not always the same ones. At the end
of the 09/10 and 13/14 seasons, see Table 3, only 5 teams (underlined) are both
in the top ten ranking. The other teams, either going down or up are mentioned
with their season ranking.
11
References
[1] R. Axelrod, M. D. Cohen, Harnessing complexity: Organizational implica-
tions on a scientific frontier (New York, Free Press, 1999 )
[2] W. B. Arthur, Science 284, 107 (999)
[3] H. Kantz, T. Schreiber, Nonlinear time series analysis (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1997).
[4] A. Gadomski, Nonlinear Phenomena in Complex Systems. 3, 321 (2000).
[5] N. K. Vitanov, I. P. Jordanov, Z. I. Dimitrova, Communications in Non-
linear Science and Numerical Simulation 14, 2379 (2009).
[6] C. S. Bertuglia, F. Vaio, Nonlinearity, Chaos, and Complexity: The Dy-
namics of Natural and Social Systems (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2005)
[7] J. Kwapien´, S. Droz˙dz˙, Phys. Rep. 515, 115 (2012).
[8] P. Bak, C. Tang, K. Wiesenfeld, Phys. Rev. Lett. 59, 381 (1987).
[9] B. M. Roehner, Driving forces in physical, biological and socio-economic
phenomena: a network science investigation of social bonds and interac-
tions, (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
[10] G. K. Zipf, Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort : An Intro-
duction to Human Ecology (Cambridge, Mass : Addison Wesley, 1949)
[11] H. M. Edwards, Riemann Zeta Function (Academic Press, 1974).
[12] N. M. Temme, Special Functions: An Introduction to Classical Functions
of Mathematical Physics (Wiley, New York, 1996).
[13] E. C. Titchmarsh, The Theory of the Riemann Zeta Function (Oxford
University Press, 1951).
[14] Deng Weibing, Li Wei, Cai Xu, A. Bulou, A. Wang Qiuping, New J. Phys.
14, 093038 (2012).
[15] B. Pilavci, On-pitch success in UEFA Champions League: an empirical
analysis of economic, demographic and traditional factors, Master’s thesis
within Economics and Management of Entertainment & Art Industries,
Jo¨nko¨ping University (2011).
[16] C. P. Barros, J. del Corral, P. Garcia-del-Barrio, J. Sport. Econom. 9, 451
(2008).
[17] C. P. Barros, P. Garcia-del-Barrio, Econ. Model. 25, 994 (2008).
[18] http : //www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/homefifa/index.html
[19] http : //www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/confederations/index.html
[20] R. T. Stefani, J. Appl. Stat. 24, 635 (1997).
12
[21] W. Kern, D. Paulusma, Discr. Appl. Math. 108, 317 (2001).
[22] P. Macmillan, I. Smith, J. Sport Econ. 8, 202 (2007).
[23] M. Ausloos, R. Cloots, A. Gadomski , N. K. Vitanov, arxiv1403.5683.
[24] A. C. Constantinou, N. E. Fenton, Journal of Quantitative Analysis in
Sports, 9, 37 (2013).
[25] http : //fr.uefa.com/memberassociations/uefarankings/club/index.html.
[26] R. A. Fairthorne, J. Doc. 25, 319 (1969).
[27] D. Lavalette, Facteur d’impact: impartialite´ ou impuissance?, Internal Re-
port, INSERM U350, Institut Curie, France. (Nov. 1996)
[28] C. Rose, D. Murray, D. Smith, Mathematical Statistics with Mathematica
(Springer, New York, 2002) p. 107.
[29] R. Mansilla, E. Ko¨ppen, G. Cocho, P. Miramontes, J. Informetr. 1, 155
(2007).
[30] I.A. Voloshynovska, J. Quant. Linguist. 18, 274 (2011).
[31] K. Levenberg, Quart. Appl. Math. 2, 164 (1944).
[32] D. W. Marquardt, J. Soc. Ind. Appl. Math. 11, 431 (1963).
[33] M. I. A. Lourakis, Foundation of Research and Technology 4, 1 (2011).
[34] A. Ranganathan, The Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm, Tutorial on LM
Algorithm (2004).
[35] M. E. J. Newman, Contemp. Phys 46, 323 (2005).
[36] S. Brakman, H. Garretsen, C. van Marrewijk, M. van den Berg, J. Regional
Sci. 39, 182 (1999).
[37] Deloitte, Annual Review of Football Finance (2013)
[38] T. L. Hill, Thermodynamics of Small Systems (Dover,New York, 1994).
[39] A. Gadomski, J. M. Rubi, Chem. Phys. 293, 169 (2003).
[40] J. M. Rubi, D. Bedeaux, S. Kjelstrup, J. Phys. Chem. B 110, 12733 (2006).
[41] I. Fainmesser, Ch. Fershtman, N. Gandal, J. Sport. Econ. 10, 582 (2009).
13
